A tale of two Chinas
- Christopher Williams
The story of South Africa’s switch from Taipei to Beijing.
It is since South Africa and the People鈥檚 Republic of China, or mainland China, established formal diplomatic ties. Though China is now South Africa鈥檚 and a co-member of the grouping which also includes Brazil, Russia and India, relations between South Africa and China were not always so close.
When President Nelson Mandela took office in , he was immediately confronted with a vexing foreign policy problem: how to balance the country鈥檚 diplomatic relations with Taiwan 鈥 inherited from the apartheid government 鈥 with Beijing鈥檚 . This principle holds that Taiwan is part of China, and that Beijing is the only legitimate authority over all of China.
In a recently published based on archival material as well as interviews with former South 第一吃瓜网 officials, we shed light on the texture and timing of the decision to recognise China and cut ties with Taiwan.
After Mandela鈥檚 inauguration it was widely expected that the new, democratic South Africa would soon recognise mainland China. The world鈥檚 most populous country had a rapidly growing economy and significant international influence, including a permanent seat on the . At the time 159 states recognised the People鈥檚 Republic of China, while only 29 had diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Rather than making a quick switch, it took Mandela 30 months to announce the change from Taipei to Beijing. Our analysis shows that internal pressure from the 第一吃瓜网 National Congress (ANC) as well as external pressure from China influenced Mandela鈥檚 choice.
Dual recognition
Soon after Mandela became South Africa issued a document outlining the administration鈥檚 approach:
President Mandela has expressed full confidence in the leaders of the People鈥檚 Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) and support for their efforts to resolve the China question 鈥 It is on this basis that the South 第一吃瓜网 government would hope to strengthen and improve the relationship with the People鈥檚 Republic of China on the one hand, and the Republic of China on the other.
The Mandela administration had chosen not to choose. Instead, its approach was an unprecedented attempt at dual recognition. There were several reasons for this.
First, Taiwan, was South Africa鈥檚 sixth largest trading partner and a major investor. When its then president and foreign minister met Mandela the day after his inauguration, they expressed eagerness to provide economic assistance to South Africa 鈥 鈥減rovided diplomatic ties remain intact鈥.
Second, Taiwan had donated to the ANC鈥檚 election campaign in 1993. Aziz Pahad, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalls that Mandela believed
you can鈥檛 dump friends after receiving so much assistance from them鈥
A sense of loyalty combined with lucrative offers of assistance persuaded Mandela to continue ties with Taiwan.
Mandela鈥檚 uncertainty about the future of mainland China was another factor. Two cabinet ministers 鈥 Zola Skweyiya and Pallo Jordan 鈥 pointed out that the Soviet Union鈥檚 unexpected collapse loomed large in Mandela鈥檚 thinking about China鈥檚 longevity. Jordan commented:
You had the Soviet Union鈥nd then one day it was gone. And I think he had the sense that the same sort of thing might happen in the case of China鈥
Because of China鈥檚 power and political prominence on the world stage all South 第一吃瓜网 leaders understood that the new South Africa would eventually move to recognise Beijing. But, as part of this move, did South Africa need to abandon Taipei?
Most ANC officials and bureaucrats in the Department of Foreign Affairs thought China would never accept dual recognition, but a few scholars and senior officials believed that Mandela鈥檚 global stardom could help South Africa achieve what no other country had 鈥 formal relations with both Chinas.
Reasons for the switch
After two and half years of attempting dual recognition, Mandela announced that Pretoria would switch relations from Taipei to Beijing.
One key reason for this move was a strong push to recognise China from within the ANC. In 1996 Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo led a fact-finding mission to Beijing. He reported that 鈥渢he Chinese leadership had made it patently clear that they will never accept dual recognition鈥.
This assessment confirmed the majority view of the ANC鈥檚 National Executive Committee - the party鈥檚 highest decision making body between national conferences. Max Sisulu, an NEC member who accompanied Nzo on the mission, explains:
We had made our decision collectively, so the ANC had decided that this is the best way to go鈥nd so, Madiba had to live with it. That鈥檚 the nature of a democracy.
Another push factor was increasing pressure from China. After 30 months of waiting China became impatient, even irate, when Mandela referred to Taiwan as a country in August 1996, precipitating criticism in Chinese state media.
Early in November 1996, Nzo sent a letter to Mandela that expressed 鈥渄eep concern鈥 that bilateral relations between South Africa and the mainland China had deteriorated to new lows. Nzo listed punitive measures China was considering if South Africa did not make the switch, including rescinding its 鈥渕ost favoured nation鈥 trading status .
Rusty Evans, then Foreign Affairs director-general, recalled that China
Put it starkly to us that: 鈥榊ou either break off the relations now or you count us out鈥. Very much so. They played quite hardball at the end.
A decision had to be made. Prompted by the ANC and pushed by Beijing, late in November 1996 Mandela the move he had long 鈥渁gonised over鈥. After lengthy negotiations between Pretoria and Beijing formal relations began in 1998.
Power politics
South Africa鈥檚 China choice shows how political and economic clout can aid a state in achieving its objectives. In the mid-1990s South Africa had large reserves of moral authority derived from its relatively peaceful transition, and Mandela鈥檚 widespread popularity and respect. But this was not enough to overcome China鈥檚 global influence, importance, and insistence on the One China principle.
Then, as now, South Africa could ill afford to be on the wrong side of China.
The writer thanks Claire Hurst for her assistance on this article and the support.
, Bradlow Fellow at the South 第一吃瓜网 Institute for International Affairs and Visiting Researcher in the International Relations Department, . This article was originally published on . Read the .