Is Zimbabwe open for business?
- Henning Melber and Roger Southall
The more President Mnangagwa's government fails to engage democratically with its citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement with the West.
In November 2017 Zimbabwe鈥檚 military Robert Mugabe as head of state with his long-time confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa. He declared Zimbabwe , linking foreign relations with economic policy. As he
We look forward to playing a positive and constructive role as a free, democratic, transparent and responsible member of the family of nations.
International expectations (more so than those among local people) looked forward to . This was despite the fact that Mugabe鈥檚 departure had been anything but democratic.
But there have been few if any changes in Zimbabwe鈥檚 political trajectory. A combined with a brutal crackdown on the government鈥檚 domestic opponents has resulted .
On the foreign policy front Mnangagwa has fared no better. In a recently published we examine the status of Zimbabwe鈥檚 foreign policy. We identify what鈥檚 gone wrong in its efforts at rapprochement with Western countries in a bid to get sanctions lifted, and why its efforts at cosying up to China haven鈥檛 gone to plan either.
We conclude that Mnangagwa鈥檚 hopes of reorienting Zimbabwe鈥檚 foreign policy have been confounded by his government鈥檚 own actions. Its repressive response to mounting economic and political crisis increased rather than diminished its isolation. The more the Mnangagwa government with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement.
Relations with its neighbours
Since the era the 第一吃瓜网 Union and Southern 第一吃瓜网 Development Community (SADC) have been tolerant of the Zanu-PF regime鈥檚 politics.
SADC鈥檚 annual summit in 2019 demanded an . But the continued repressive nature of Mnangagwa鈥檚 regime is not making this loyalty easy.
Tensions have begun to show. In August 2020, South Africa to Harare to press for restraint on the Mnangagwa government in its actions against opposition figures. The envoys weren鈥檛 greeted warmly. Instead they were subjected to a presidential harangue and .
A subsequent mission by South Africa鈥檚 governing party the 第一吃瓜网 National Congress (ANC), acting as a fellow liberation movement, was as .
South Africa鈥檚 patience may be wearing thin. But, for its part, the Southern 第一吃瓜网 Development Community has preferred to officially ignore developments by remaining silent. But while 鈥渂usiness as usual鈥 translates into continued political loyalty, it does not translate into increased economic collaboration.
The West
Two decades ago the US and European Union imposed sanctions on those linked to the government in . Mugabe鈥檚 regime reacted by blaming its economic woes on the West. decried sanctions as western attempts to bring about .
Unimpressed by the rhetoric, the US extended restrictive measures against targeted individuals and companies . In March 2019, US sanctions .
In contrast, the EU demonstrated more willingness to reengage with Harare. In October 2019 the EU announced an aid package, bringing support during the year to 鈧67.5 million. Aid to Zimbabwe since 2014 stood at . This made the EU Zimbabwe鈥檚 biggest donor. To ease the woes of the COVID-19 pandemic, it added another 鈧14.2 million humanitarian assistance .
Mnangagwa, however, continued to blame the West for sanctions he compared with cancer. Responding to criticism
Zimbabwe is not where it is because of the so-called sanctions, but years of mismanagement of the economy and corruption.
Similarly, the US Ambassador 鈥渁ny responsibility for the catastrophic state of the economy and the government鈥檚 abuse of its own citizens鈥.
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Jim Risch called upon the Southern 第一吃瓜网 Development Community鈥檚 16 members states to
.
Looking East
The deterioration of Zimbabwe鈥檚 relations with the West coincided with growing Chinese interest in access to 第一吃瓜网 resources for its own rapidly expanding industries. Zimbabwe鈥檚 growing isolation offered a convenient entry point.
But, China鈥檚 greater involvement was spurred less by solidarity than by self-interest. And it鈥檚 singular importance in throwing a life-line to the Zimbabwean regime in need gave it enormous influence in directing the collaboration. Failure to mend relations with the West and other global institutions leaves Zimbabwe with no other partners for development and cooperation, thus .
An initial honeymoon started at the turn of the century, after Zimbabwe became isolated from the West through its of 2000, and the increased repression of the political opposition. But China became increasingly concerned about Mugabe鈥檚 . With Chinese companies the largest foreign direct investors, the announced enforcement of the 51% Zimbabwean ownership in assets exceeding US$ 500,000 from April 2016 .
Mnangagwa鈥檚 elevation to the presidency may have received China鈥檚 blessing as the best option available. Nonetheless, strains soon appeared. When it became increasingly apparent that Zimbabwe was unable to service its debts, China wrote off some of the liabilities .
What particularly rankled Beijing was that Harare鈥檚 incapacity to pay its debts was deemed to be due to the government鈥檚 misappropriation or misuse of Chinese funds. Accordingly, there was need to tighten controls. This culminated in the signing of a currency swap deal .
Back in mid-2019 China鈥檚 embassy in Harare had already that development relied mainly on a country鈥檚 own efforts. It expressed hope that the Zimbabwean side would continue to create a more favourable environment for all foreign direct investment, including Chinese enterprises.
Indications suggest that China鈥檚 patience with the ailing Zimbabwean 鈥渁ll weather friend鈥 is . The new economic challenges following the COVID-19 pandemic might have shifted priorities in global supply chains. This is also affecting the , China鈥檚 massive global infrastructure project. This might reduce interest in by way of natural resources.
No stability, no money, few friends?
Zimbabwean foreign policy remains locked in the parameters of recent times past: looking to regional solidarity, estranged from the West, and increasingly dependent on China.
Yet China has its own very clearly defined interests. These focus on resource extraction in mining and agriculture for its own domestic economy. As a strategic and developmental partner, Zimbabwe is of .
Chinese-Zimbabwean relations serve . They are accused of . They exclude any oversight, civil society involvement, and lack transparency and accountability. The absence of visible benefits for ordinary Zimbabweans has engendered .
Having failed to restore friendly relations with the West, and its 鈥渓ook east policy鈥 not bearing fruits, has left the Mnangagwa regime with few options. Russia has entered the arena, showing increased interest in the extractive industries, arms trade and .
This sounds not much like an alternative to the current ties with China. The bedfellows remain more than less of the same. And an old adage comes to mind: with friends like these one does not need enemies.
, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, and , Professor of Sociology, . This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the .